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A formal model of an economy consisting of many production centres, each of which levies 
property taxes at a different rate, is developed and analyzed. In the context of the model, it 
is shown that holders of capital may have either a positive or negative willingness to pay for a 
heterogenous system of taxes relative to a uniform tax which raises the same revenue. Particular 
emphasis is placed on interpretation of the ‘new view’ of the property tax in light of this and 
other results which derive from the model. 
1. Introduction 
The key insight in the ‘new view’ of the property tax is that the impact of 
local taxes on an economy as a whole will be very different from the impact of 
di$mznces in such taxes across localities within an economy.’ The effects 
of property taxes, then, derive both from the general level of property taxation 
(which is seen as being borne by capital everywhere in the system) and from 
variation in local tax rates, which cause excise effects. The incidence of these 
excise effects is unknown a priori, as is generally the case with taxes that are 
potentially shiftable. 
Precise theoretical propositions concerning the relationships between these 
excise effects and the economy-wide effects of local taxation require an explicit 
general equilibrium model of an economy in which there are many cities which 
impose property taxes at different rates. The major purpose of this paper is to 
develop and analyze such a model, with a specific application to property 
taxation. In so doing, the paper will clarify the economic significance of the 
‘average’ property tax rate in the ‘new view’. It will be shown that the average 
*I am grateful to the members of the seminar in economic theory at The University of 
Michigan, and most especially Theodore C. Bergstrom for helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. In addition, I acknowledgethe perceptive comments of Harvey Brazer, 
Alan Deardorff, Edward Gramlich and John Laitner. The model used in this paper derives in 
part from work done jointly with Daniel L. Rubinfeld, to whom I owe a considerable intellectual 
debt. Both referees and A. B. Atkinson made useful comments on the penultimate draft. With all 
of this talented assistance, anything still wrong must be my fault. 
‘The ‘new view’ of the property tax was developed by Mieszkowski (1969, 1972) following 
from Harberger’s work on the corporate income tax (1962), and appears to be well on its way 
to becoming orthodoxy, as expressed by Aaron (1975), among others. 
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tax rate which is computed by weighting local tax rates by physical quantities 
of capital will not suffice either as a generally accurate measure of the tax 
burden borne by capital or a benchmark for computing excise effects.* Further, 
it will be shown that the error in this measure can be either positive or negative, 
and that under certain circumstances it can be quite large relative to total tax 
revenue in the system. 
This result may have considerable policy significance in light of recent court 
decisions (notably the Serrano decision) which have led to proposals that 
States assume responsibility for education finance. An important implication 
of this paper is that implementation of a state administered property tax at 
the average of rates levied by localities will in general change the distribution 
of tax incidence across factors. Furthermore, it will change the equilibrium 
distribution of city sizes - and cities which currently levy taxes at the average 
rate may either grow or shrink. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a formal model of an 
economy with many taxing jurisdictions. In section 3 the model is employed 
to derive propositions concerning the incidence and excess burden of hetero- 
geneous property taxes. It is shown that in general there exists no uniform tax 
rate which would balance the public budget and impose the same burden on 
capital as that deriving from a given system of heterogeneous local tax rates. 
Section 4 derives conditions which determine incidence and presents numerical 
examples for the CES case. Section 5 discusses some policy implications of the 
above exercises, and suggests ways in which the model might be improved. 
2. The formal model3 
Assumption I. There is a jixed stock of capital I? available to the economy 
which is closed. 
This assumption is standard in discussions of the ‘new view’ and indeed in all 
discussions of general equilibrium tax incidence following from Harberger 
(1962). To the extent that capital is mobile across economies (or otherwise 
elastically supplied) the quantity of capital actually employed would have to 
be endogenously determined within the model, which would greatly complicate 
the analysis. While the issues raised by the possibility of international capital 
mobility may have important implications for our understanding of the effects 
of taxes on capital, they will be ignored here .4 Assumption 1 implies that if 
the marginal product of capital is positive all of the capital in the system (R) 
will be employed. 
*See Mieszkowski (1972, pp. 79-80), and Aaron (1975, pp. 3%55), for discussions of the 
role of the average tax and its relation to excise effects. 
3The model presented in this section is an extension and generalization of the model used in 
Courant and Rubinfeld (1978). 
4Alternatively, the model may be considered as a model of the world economy. 
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Assumption 2. There exist N locations within the economy, indexed 
i= I,..., N, in which production is feasible and in which there is ajixed, strictly 
positive stock qf land, Li . 
Assumption 3. The production technology at each location i is given by 
qi = fi(Ki), where q is a homogeneous consumption good and each fi( *) is 
increasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable, andfi(0) = 0. 
The purpose of assumptions 2 and 3 is to assure that it is sensible for there 
to exist a competitive equilibrium in which localities tax at different rates and 
production still takes place in those localities where rates are high. This is 
assured if the number of production locations is finite and production at each 
location exhibits diminishing marginal returns to mobile factors. 
If assumption 2 did not hold, capital would simply move to a new (heretofore 
unused) production location (in which tax rates would be zero) whenever taxes 
were iimposed in an old one. Assumption 3 embodies the requirement that 
individual cities can produce output only at increasing marginal costs. Clearly, 
with a technology that is concave in Ki, and Li fixed, there is increasing marginal 
cost at any level of Ki in any city i. 5 
Assumption 4. All markets (land, capital and consumption good) are perfectly 
competitive. 
Assumption 5. Both landowners and capitalists seek to maximize their claims 
on the homogenous consumption good. 
Assumptions 4 and 5 assure that in an equilibrium in which no taxes are 
imposed the marginal product of capital will be equal in all cities where pro- 
duction takes place. Furthermore, since all economic agents in the system care 
only about their claims on the single good, we need not be concerned with 
pricing that good. Total income going to capitalists will simply be the marginal 
physical product of capital (denoted s) times total capital, while landlords in 
each city will simply receive the residual output in the city. Denoting total 
output in the system as Q, we may write: 
Q = T qi = Tf,(KJ, i=l 3 . . . . N. (1) 
%oth assumptions 2 and 3 have some theoretical and empirical foundation. In a standard 
model of urban structure [i.e. Mills (1967, 1972); Muth (1969)] the diseconomy of scale re- 
flected in assumption 3 would derive from the fact that average transportation costs within a 
city increase with scale, even if the supply of land is perfectly elastic to a given city. Assumption 
2 reflects the idea that cities develop in locations which are technically well suited to production 
and distribution of goods and services [see Mills (1972)]. To the extent that we observe capital 
flows among existing cities, rather than widespread creation of new cities, assumption 2 reflects 
the essential facts of the matter. 
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Furthermore, from the condition for equilibrium in the capital market, 
and the assumption that production in each city is concave in K, 
s L f,‘(KJ, i = 1, . ..) N, (2) 
s =x!(Ki) if Ki # 0, i=l 9 .a*> N. (3) 
Thus, 
SKi = Kifi’(Ki), 
where the notationfi(Ki) is 
Thus capitalists receive a 
w = SK, 
and income of landlords is 
i=l 3 ***, N, 
the derivative off,(K,) with respect to Ki. 
total income of 
(4) 
(5) 
R = c Ri = c(qi-SK,) = Q-W. (6) 
i i 
Eqs. (2)-(4) give the equilibrium condition for the allocation of capital 
among cities in the absence of taxes. In the discussion of the model to follow, 
three different formulations for levying property taxes will be considered. Each 
of these formulations leads to different statements of equilibrium conditions 
analogous to (4). Furthermore, it will be convenient to represent property 
taxes as taxes on flows of current income from the taxed factors; thus the tax 
rates discussed below should be seen as the ‘true’ property tax rate multiplied 
by a common discount rate, and the variable s is now the after tax rental price 




Taxes applied to the market value of capital (with tax rates Ti) in which 
case the equilibrium condition is 
Kifl(Ki) = S( 1+ Ti)Ki ) i= l,...,N; (7) 
Taxes applied to value marginal product of capital (with tax rates pi) 
in which case the equilibrium condition is 
Kifi’(Ki)( 1 - ri) = SKi ) i=l , **., N; (8) 
Taxes applied to physical quantities of capital (with tax rates ti) in 
which case the equilibrium condition is 
Ki[fi(Ki) - ti] = sKi, i=l 9 ..*, N. (9) 
All three formulations and their respective equilibrium conditions are 
equivalent for a given capital allocation. The relationships among the formula- 
tions are given by 
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Kifil(Ki) = S(l +Ti)Ki = K,S(l-pi) = (S+ti)Ki, 
i= l,...,N. (10) 
Thus, for any s, and Ki # 0, 
Ci = STi = SZ,/(~-Z,), i = 1, . . . . N. (11) 
In summary, then, the model takes as data R, the N-vector of land endow- 
ments, L, and N production functions,J;(K,). For any vector of taxes on physical 
capital, t, (9) gives N equations for N+ 1 unknowns (Kl , . . . , KN, and s). But 
the fixed R adds the condition that 
~Ki=iT. (12) 
This makes explicit the fact that s and all of the K’s are functions of all of the 
t’s (which can of course be converted into T’s or T’S by using (11)). The 
notation s(t) will be used to express the value of s for a given vector of tax 
rates. Further, the capital allocation which solves the model when tax rates 
are identical everywhere will be denoted by the N-vector K*, with elements 
K:, . . . . KG. Aggregate output is, of course, maximized at the allocation K *. 
3. Incidence and excess burden in the model 
This section will analyze the impact of alternative distributions of tax rates 
across cities under the constraint that total tax revenue in the system is held 
constant. Thus it may be seen as an exercise in balanced budget incidence in 
which the taxes being compared are different distributions of local property 
taxes. The incidence of a given distribution of local tax rates will be computed 
with respect to the state of the world obtaining when the same total revenue is 
raised by application of a uniform tax rate to all jurisdictions in the economy. 
Thus the (balanced budget) incidence of a vector of taxes t on some set of 
actors in the model will be the willingness to pay of that set of actors for replac- 
ing the vector t with a uniform tax rate which raises the same tax revenue. 
Balanced budget incidence so defined may be either positive or negative.‘j 
6Absolute incidence, or the total ‘burden’ of the tax system on a set of actors will be balanced 
budget incidence as defined here plus the willingness to pay of that set of actors for substituting 
no taxes for the uniform tax rate. The advantage of using balanced budget incidence is that 
it permits comparison of prit’ate tastes for states of the world in which the public budget is 
held constant. Unfortunately, the comparison is still imperfect, as in general we would expect 
the pattern of public expenditures by locality to be different under different tax regimes even 
if the total public budget were held constant, and we would expect actors in the system to have 
a willingness to pay for such differences. To deal with this issue would require that a model of 
demand and supply of public expenditures, locality by locality, be incorporated into the analysis. 
Development of such a model is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
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The total revenue raised by a vector t of taxes on capital is given by 
G = C tiKi(t) = R C ti~i(t)/K = it,, (13) 
where t, is the average rate of taxation applying to physical quantities of 
capital. Clearly, the same revenue will be raised if t, is applied to all jurisdictions, 
as the physical quantity of capital in the system is constant by assumption.7 
The market price of capital services under the vector of taxes t will be 
s(t) = f;,‘(Ki(t))- ri 3 Ki # 0; (14) 
while the market price of capital under the uniform tax rate t, is given by 
Thus, 
s(r,) = f;YK’*) - t, , Ki # 0. (19 
Ki(s(r)-s(rg)) = Ki(J;,‘(Ki(r))- ri-f/(KT) + to), K, # 0. (16) 
Summing over i gives the willingness to pay (of capitalists) for the tax system, t 
R(s(t)-s(t,)) = C K,f,‘(Ki(t))-~~(Ki*), Ki # 0. (17) 
l 
If (17) is divided through by x it is clear that willingness to pay is positive 
or negative as the marginal physical product of capital in the allocation K * 
is less than or greater than the average marginal physical product of capital 
in the allocation K(t). (The average product of capital will always be higher in 
the allocation K*, but that is not the issue.) Note that if (17) is positive, then 
the average tax rate on capital overstates the loss of income by capital relative 
to a zero-tax regime. This magnitude (s(t)-s(O)) will be referred to below as 
the ‘total burden’ on capital of the tax system t. Analogously, if (17) is negative, 
the average tax rate understates the total burden borne by capital in the system 
of heterogeneous taxes. Furthermore, if (17) is positive, substitution of the 
average tax computed on value or marginal product (T or r) would lower total 
tax revenue (i.e. both value and average marginal product will be lower under 






and r. = C -, 
i K 
it is not true in general that assessing a uniform rate T, on market value or r, on marginal 
product would raise the same revenue as would be raised if the vectors Tand r were applied to 
their respective tax bases. See footnote 8 for a proof. 
8More formally, it is asserted that 
sgntG(T) - G(T,) 1 = s&G(7) - G(z.) 1 = sgnts(t) - s(tJ I, (9 
where the elements Ti and ri of the vectors Tand r are defined by equation (2) and T. and r, are 
as defined in footnote 7. 
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where (17) is zero does the average tax correctly measure the total burden on 
capital of a system of heterogeneous taxes. Furthermore, in this special case, 
all three definitions of the tax will yield the same results and raise identical 
revenues both in the heterogeneous tax and the uniform tax regimes. 
There is an alternative formulation for equation (17) which permits a charac- 
terization of ‘excise effects’ in the model. Define 
t, = s(t,)-s(t)+&. (18) 
It will now be proved that for each city i where Ki # 0, K,(t) $j KF as ti 2 t,. 
Proof 
(1) ti 5 t, = s(t,) -s(t)+ t, if and only if s(t,) + t, 2 s(t)+ ti. 
(2) This is equivalent to f;:‘(KF) 2 f/(K,(t)) since J;:‘(KF) = s(t,)+ t,, and 
J;,‘(Ki(t)) = s(t) + ti a 
(3) Since f;,“(Ki(t)) < 0, J/(KF) 2 fj(Ki(t)) if and only if KF 5 K,(t). 
Q.E.D. 
Proof: 
G(T) - G(C) = T.&V) - Q-AI, (ii) 
G(t)- G(cJ = ~h’oS~,-fi’(~*,7~ = T&(T)-47~1, K, # 0. (iii) 
Thus the signs of G(T)- G(Z) and G(T)- G(z.) will be the same, respectively, as the signs of 
s(T)-s(T.) and s(r)--s(z,,). It is therefore sufficient to prove that 
sgn [s(T)--s(T,)] = sgn [s(r)- s(7.)] = sgns(t)--(t.). (iv) 
From eq. (ll), for Ki # 0, 
Combining (v) and (15), for K, # 0, 
s(t)-&) = s(+- [fi’(K, *)- T.s(t)l = s(t)(l+ T.)-f,‘(K, “). (vi) 
But s(t) must equal s(T), thus 
fi’W*) 4) - 4&J -= sm--s(G) = s(t) - (I$- To) u+T.1 . 
(vii) 
This proves that sgn [s(T)-s(T,) = sgn [s(t)-&)]. The second part of (iv) can be proved 
in a similar fashion. 
I3 
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Because cities gain (lose) capital relative to KF as ti is less than (greater 
than) t,, the excise effects of the tax system t are properly computed with 
respect to t,, rather than t,. Furthermore, eq. (17) can be rewritten in terms of 
the relationship between t, and ta. From the definition of t,, 
s(t)-&) = to--t,, (19) 
R(s(t)-s&J) = R(t,-- t,). (20) 
Recalling eq. (17) and its interpretation, eq. (20) says that if the tax rate 
in tax system t for which there are no excise effects is greater (less) than the 
average tax rate in system t then capital owners will have a negative (positive) 
willingness to pay for system t over the uniform tax (t,) which would raise the 
same revenue. Thus, the total burden of the vector of tax rates t on capital is 
overstated (understated) by t, as t, is greater than (less than) t,. Furthermore, 
there does not in general exist a uniform tax rate t,’ such that s(t) and s(t,) are 
equal while G(t) and G(t,) are equal. Thus it seems fruitless to look for a single 
‘average’ tax which represents the balanced budget burden of a tax system 
on capital. The total burden, ignoring the public budget, is measured by t,, 
rather than t,, in that s(te) if t, were applied uniformly, would just equal s(t). 
Eqs. (17) and (20) may also be interpreted to consider the shifting of taxes 
on capital. Clearly, if the willingness to pay of capitalists for the tax vector t 
relative to t, is nonnegative (i.e. t, < t,,), then landlords as a class bear at least 
all of the excess burden (which is simply Q(t,,)- Q(t)) of the system of taxes t. 
This follows directly from the facts that 
(1) landlords’ income is computed as a residual; 
(2) total output is lower under the system t than under the uniform tax; 
(3) government revenue is the same under both systems; 
(4) capitalists’ income is at least as great under the heterogeneous taxes as 
under the uniform tax. 
Thus, if capitalists and government don’t lose, and output falls, landlords 
must lose. If capitalists gain, landlords lose more than the excess burden. It 
does not follow, however, that if capitalists lose landlords gain. This is because 
there is a loss of output associated with any heterogeneous set of tax rates, and 
the excess burden may be shared by the two sets of actors in the model. 
In any event, statements about landlords in the aggregate imply nothing 
about landlords in individual cities. The excise effects of a heterogeneous 
system of property tax rates will lead output to rise in some cities and fall in 
others, even as total output falls. With the rather general assumptions made 
thus far concerning the production functions, it is not possible to characterize 
winners and losers among landlords as a function of the tax rates in their cities. 
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The foregoing analysis shows that capital owners may (1) prefer hetero- 
geneous taxes to homogeneous ones; (2) be indifferent; or (3) prefer homo- 
geneous taxes. Table 1 provides a summary of the key relationships in the 
model for each of these three cases under the technology assumed in section 2. 
It should be noted that case II is the only situation in which the average tax 
plays the role that it is asserted to play in the ‘new view’ of the property tax, 
in which it is held that (1) capital bears the average tax and that (2) excise 
effects occur with respect to the average tax rate. Table 1 shows that either 
both statements are true or neither of them are, and that in general the average 
tax will accurately reflect the absolute burden on capital only if exactly all of 
the excess burden is borne by other factors. 
4. Determinants of incidence 
All three of the cases summarized in table 1 are consistent with neoclassical 
production theory. Which of the three cases apply for a given economy meeting 
the assumptions made in section 2 will depend on the specifics of the N pro- 
duction functions as well as on all N elements of the tax vector t. In this section, 
the model is further simplified so as to permit a characterization of conditions 
under which each of the three cases will obtain. In particular, assumption 3 
is supplemented such that all production functions are identical and are homo- 
geneous of degree one in capital and land. 
The imposition of this additional condition on the technology permits the 
analysis of N cities of different sizes as n > N cities of the same land area. For 
example, if city j has twice the land of city i, we may maintain the fiction, for 
analytical purposes, that there are three cities with identical land endowments, 
i, j, and j’, where j and j’ have the same tax rate. Thus the indexing of cities 
(i= l,..., N ,..., n) employed in this section will simply be a rewriting of the 
indexing used in the previous sections of the paper. 
4.1. Generaljiinctionalform 
With n identical cities having identical production functions, eq. (17) may be 
rewritten - 
K(S(t)-S(tJ) =,il Kif’(Ki(t))-K f’ X ( 0) ’ 
The sign of (21) still depends on the particular configuration of tax rates in 
the vector t. However, in the neighborhood of the optimum allocation of 
capital (K(Q) it will depend only on the (identical) production functions. In 
particular, it can be shown that in the neighborhood of a uniform tax rate 
(Ki = K(t,) = R/n) willingness to pay of capitalists for a system of taxes t 
relative to the uniform tax t, will be positive (negative) as the second derivative 
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of gross payments to capital with respect to capital is positive (negative).’ 
Alternatively, s(r,) is a local maximum (minimum) as 
For a Cobb-Douglas production function, (22) will always be negative, and, 
indeed (21) will always be negative, as the share of output received by capital is 
constant, and output is lower than Q* under any allocation of capital other than 
K*. For CES production functions, (22) may be positive, negative, or zero, 
depending on a set of conditions which will be explored later in this paper. For 
the class of production functions for which Kf’(K) is always constant, (21) will 
always be equal to zero, and case II in table 1 will hold globally. However, 
none of the functional forms in common use have this property, and case II 
(the new view case) will not hold in general unless the technologies of all cities 
meet this condition.” 
The additional assumptions on the technology made in this section of the 
paper also permit a more precise characterization of which landlords gain 
and lose relative to the state of the world under the uniform tax rate t,. In 
particular, for any vector of tax rates t consider the tax rate t, such that landlords 
in a city levying t, receive precisely the same income under the vector t as they 
would under the uniform tax rate t, . Assume that t, - t, is positive and recall 
that this implies that s(t) is greater than s(t,). Since city e has the same output 
under both regimes, landlords in city e will be worse off (getting the residual) 
under regime t than under regime t,. Thus if t,- t, is positive, t,- t, must also 
be positive (i.e. there will have to be more output for landlords’ residual claim 
to offset the increased rental rate on capital) and in general the sign of t,- t, 
will be the same as the sign of t,- t,. 
Unfortunately, because of the complexity of the model, characterization of 
the determinants of incidence by means of general properties of the production 
functions cannot be accomplished except in the neighborhood of K*. In general, 
the aggregate average marginal productivity of capital schedule (upon which 
incidence depends) is not uniquely defined by the production functions them- 
selves. Rather, it is defined by the production functions and all of the tax rates - 
which together determine the vector of capital allocations. For specific functional 
forms, however, the properties of different equilibria may be computed and 
analyzed explicitly as a function of the tax rates. The CES production function 
‘The derivations for results stated in this section are available from the author. 
“‘The condition that Kf’(K) be constant is equivalent to the condition that the marginal 
product of capital schedules be rectangular hyperbolas. Recalling the assumption that pro- 
duction functions be HDI, this condition is met only for functions of the form q = CL (In (K/L)), 
where c is an arbitrary constant. To assert that the ‘new view’ case (case II) holds exactly, then, 
is to assume this functional form. 
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is well suited to such analysis, as any of the three cases in table 1 can follow 
from a CES under different values of the parameters and tax rates. 
4.2. The CES case 
Retaining the assumption that each of n cities have identical land area, and 
normalizing that land area as unity, the assumption of identical CES pro- 
duction functions in all cities may be stated as 
qi = [ctK-P+(l -cc)]-“P, i= l,...,n, (23) 
where the elasticity of substitution (a) equals l/(1 +p). With some manipulation, 
it can be shown that for (23) 
-&K.f’(K)) = [(l +p)cc(l -cf)K-(z+p)q(1+3p)] 
x [p(l-ol)-(1 Sp)K_Pl. (24) 
As p must be greater than - 1 and as c( must be less than unity, the expression 
in the left-hand set of brackets in (24) will always be positive. From (22), then, 
the uniform allocation is a local maximum (minimum) for rentals to capital 
as 
p(l-cr) 5 (l+p)crKP. (25) 
Multiplying both sides of (25) by qp and recalling that the competitive share of 
capital in a CES is (q/IQ’, it is easily shown that (25) may be restated as 
SW) 
U-4 5 -9 
S(L) 
(26) 
where S(K) and S(L) are the competitive factor shares. 
Note that if p is negative (a greater than one) the uniform allocation of 
capital must be a local maximum for gross capital rentals. 
A similar procedure can be used to show that gross payments to land will 
be maximized (minimized) at the uniform capital allocation as 
Combining conditions (26) and (27) it is clear that the 
can never be a local minimum for both factors. It will be a 
both factors where 
(27) 
uniform allocation 
local maximum for 
S(K)/S(L) > 1 --a; S(L)/S(K) > 1-o. (28) 
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This condition always holds where the elasticity of substitution is equal to or 
greater than unity. 
Again, conditions (26) through (28) hold only in the neighborhood of the 
uniform capital allocation. For other allocations, the incidence of capital 
taxes will depend both on the parameters of the production function and on the 
specific distribution of tax rates. Equilibrium requires that for each city i, 
ctK-(‘+P)[ctK-P+(l_~)]-(l+PJP)_fi = .J, i= 1 , .*a, n, (29) 
Thus, for any pair of cities i and j, 
i= 1 9 -**, n, j=l,..., n. (30) 
Eq. (30) may be solved implicitly for any Ki as a function of a given Kj and the 
two relevant tax rates. In practice, it is easy to set the K’s so as to add up to a 
given if, set one tax rate, and solve for all of the other tax rates-hence the 
form ot eq. (30). Table 2 revises table 1 for three cases of CES production. 
In all three cases there are assumed to be only two cities, one of which taxes 
at a high rate, and the other at a lower rate. In all three cases both the elasticity 
of substitution and the parameter c( assume a value of one-half. 
The examples presented in table 2 confirm the analytical results derived 
earlier in the paper. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the examples is 
that the entries in the column (V(t,) - V(t))/G take on values of both signs and 
have magnitudes that are quite different from zero. The absolute value of 
entries in that column measures the difference between the total burden of a 
given tax system f and that of a uniform tax raising the same revenue as a fraction 
of total tax revenue. This may be interpreted as the percentage error associated 
with using the average rate of capital taxation to measure the burden of a 
system of property taxes on capital. 
5. Conclusions and implications 
The purpose of this paper has been to construct and analyze a model of an 
economy in which a mobile factor is taxed at different rates in different locations. 
The main result of that exercise has been a demonstration that the relationship 
between the general effects of such taxation and the specific effects, locality by 
iocality, is not easily characterized. The reason for this is that these effects are 
not independent. Alternative schemes of local capital taxation raising identical 
revenues will not in general have identical excess burdens; nor will distributions 
of such excess burdens across factors and across localities be independent of 
the particular form of the taxing schemes. Further, even if all production 
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functions are identical and total tax revenue is fixed, the properties of the 
production functions alone do not provide sufficient information to compute 
the magnitude and distribution of excess burdens. Thus, conceptual separation 
of the incidence of local capital taxes into ‘average’ and ‘excise’ effects is an 
approximation at best, and, as is indicated by the examples in table 2, it may 
not be a very good approximation. 
Drawing of direct policy conclusions from the model presented here is 
inhibited by the fact that the model is of only one sector and contains only one 
mobile input. To approach the ‘real world’, one would want, as Aaron (1975) 
has suggested, a model with two mobile factors (labor and capital) and two 
sectors (local and national goods). Such a model could be developed using the 
general framework employed in this paper. The analysis would be much more 
complicated, however, and it would probably be necessary to resort to extensive 
simulation in order to derive results analogous to those derived here. Thus, 
the specific results derived above concerning the role of factor shares in deter- 
mining willingness to pay in a two factor CES model, for example, have no 
obvious policy implications - they simply illuminate the workings of the model. 
The fact that the model used here has only one mobile factor and one pro- 
duced good also prohibits explicit consideration of the implications of hetero- 
geneous property taxes within an urban area for the efficiency with which 
public goods are provided and land is used. Both the literature arising from the 
Tiebout hypothesis and the literature on the effects of property taxation within 
an urban area involve two mobile factors (labor and capital) and two produced 
goods (housing and a composite). l1 Development of a model which could 
comprehend both intrametropolitan equilibria and intermetropolitan equilibria 
would be of great value in that analytical implications derived from such a 
model would be directly applicable for policy purposes, while those derived 
from this model are at best only suggestive. 
In spite of these difficulties, two results from the model used here can be 
expected to generalize to more complicated specifications, and they are of 
considerable policy significance : 
(1) Unless there is perfect Tiebout equilibrium, such that there is no excess 
burden associated with property taxes, holders of mobile factors may prefer 
a system of heterogeneous tax rates to a uniform tax rate raising the same 
revenue - even though the latter case leads to higher total output. Put another 
way, the excess burden of the heterogeneous tax system may be shifted more than 
one hundred percent onto fixed factors. (The reverse may also hold, but is less 
surprising.) 
(2) The tax rate at which holders of fixed factors will break even if a revenue 
preserving uniform tax is substituted for a heterogeneous set of tax rates may 
“See Hamilton (1975) for a representative example of the recent Tiebout literature. See 
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1978) for a spatial model of an urban area with property taxation. 
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be higher or lower than the average tax rate. Thus, permanent residents of 
cities (landholders) would have to perform fairly difficult computations in 
order to establish whether they would win or lose if such a policy change were 
adopted. 
Finally, it should be noted that this model, which is basically an extension 
of the Harberger model of general equilibrium incidence, can be revised to 
consider other taxation problems in which the relationship between an economy 
and its constituent parts is the key issue. One could look at changes in state 
level taxes in a national economy, at changes in national taxes in the inter- 
national economy, and other issues of this type. The difficulty in such modelling 
lies in careful specification of the mobility of factors across different political 
boundaries. The simplest possible assumption has been made here, but I would 
expect that more realistic assumptions can be fruitfully handled within the 
same general structure. 
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